Positive spillovers are often offered as an explanation for the fact that firms tend to cluster geographically. Recent research on the influence of demand on production introduces another reason for concentration. The so-called "home market effect" implies that locations with high demand will host a disproportionate share of industry. We show that both spillovers and the home market effect can result in geographical clustering of firms as defined by a level of geographic concentration superior to what would be predicted by random location choices (the dartboard model). We test whether the pattern of over 1400 Japanese investments in the United States and in the European Union is consistent with the spillovers and home market effect explanations of clustering. Our empirical analysis shows limited support for the home market effect. The level of spatial clustering is, on the other hand, shown to be consistent with a spillovers explanation for a substantial number of industries. However the dartboard model of location choice appears appropriate for some industries.
Introduction
Positive spillovers between firms and factor cost advantages may explain the observed geographic concentration of industry. Recent research on the influence of demand on production introduces a third reason for concentration. Specifically, the so-called "home market effect" implies that locations with high demand will host a disproportionate share of industry. Thus, positive spillovers, low factor costs, and the home market effect serve as forces that can result in the agglomeration of industry. Proximity has its costs, however. If locations are equally attractive, imperfect competition causes firms producing in the same location to earn lower profits than they would earn if they were to differentiate geographically. Thus, the competition effect serves as a force leading to the geographic dispersion of industry.
This paper measures geographic concentration of Japanese investment in the United States and Europe and tests for the source of observed concentration. We begin by employing Ellison and Glaeser's (1997) measure of concentration to see if the concentration of Japanese FDI is greater or less than that predicted by our formulation of their random model of investment. Next, we use conditional logit estimation to explore whether, after controlling for market size, the presence of rivals in a foreign location is associated with a higher or lower likelihood of investment in that location. A negative coefficient supports home market effects models whereas a positive coefficient is consistent with positive spillovers between firms. Finally, we relate a region's share of investment to its share of demand to test explicitly for home market effects.
Whether or not observed concentration reflects positive spillovers between firms operating in proximity (agglomeration economies) is an important question because theoretical models of agglomeration economies predict self-reinforcing concentration. These forces enable historical events to determine the geography of an industry, leading to a pattern of "have" and "have-not" areas that find it difficult to use policy to alter their status. A first step towards determining the strength and pervasiveness of agglomeration economies is to measure the extent that geographic concentration of industries exceeds a sensible benchmark. Measuring geographic concentration is useful since its absence would be sufficient evidence to reject the existence of strong agglomeration economies.
Economists have used two main methods to estimate the significance of industry concentration. The first focuses on outcomes and measures geographic concentration at a point in time. A prominent example is Krugman's (1991) calculation of Gini indexes for 3-digit US manufacturing industries. In that study the benchmark for expected activity in a state is its share of total manufacturing employment. Krugman found that most industries were fairly concentrated. Ellison and Glaeser (1997) pointed out that "lumpiness"-a small number of establishments accounting for a large share of an industry's total employment-and randomness can combine to result in seemingly concentrated outcomes. They proposed a method to calculate concentration in excess of what would occur in a random choice model that accounts for lumpiness. A second approach, initiated by Carlton (1983) , examines the process of agglomeration itself. Using a sample of new entrants, this approach estimates a conditional logit regression in which the existing amount of industry activity in a state is an explanatory variable along with a set of controls describing the attractiveness of the state.
Positive findings of concentration-the norm in most empirical work-admit multiple interpretations. Ellison and Glaeser emphasize that their findings of excess concentration are consistent with a model in which spillovers cause industries to cluster as well as a model in which certain locations possess natural advantages that attract firms in a given industry. To use their examples, we may think of Silicon Valley's information technology cluster as a likely example of the former and Napa Valley's concentration of wineries as a consequence of the latter. In a recent contribution (Ellison and Glaeser, 1999) , those same authors show that about 20% of observed geographic concentration can be explained by a small set of natural advantages variables. They consequently "conjecture that at least half of observed geographic concentration is due to natural advantages" and attribute the remaining concentration to be explained to spillovers.
Our focus is discriminating between spillovers and a third source of excess concentration: market size. A recent trade literature shows that large demand in a country can translate into a disproportionate share of production. Krugman (1980) first established the result for differentiated goods industries characterized by free entry and increasing returns to scale where consumers have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. Feenstra, Markusen and Rose (2001) extend this result to a Cournot, segmented markets (CSM) framework with homogenous goods, free entry, and consumers with Cobb-Douglas utility. Head, Mayer, and Ries (2002) employ a location choice framework to show that three models of imperfect competition-the Krugman model, a homogeneous good, Cournot model with linear demand, and the monopolistic competition model of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) -yield common predictions about the relationship between a country's share of consumers and its share of firms as well as a country's share of consumers and its net exports.
Our empirical work examines the location decisions of over 1400 manufacturing investments that Japanese firms made in the United States and the European Union since 1970. Several considerations motivated the selection of this sample. First, to compare concentration outcomes with the process that generated them, one requires information on the establishment dates for each of the plants existing at the time concentration is measured. While this seems impractical in the case of indigenous manufacturers, Japanese firms had virtually no presence in the US or EU prior to 1970. Hence, we can observe location patterns during a compact period of time. A second feature of this sample is that relatively small numbers of investments in each industry cause the lumpiness problem that Ellison and Glaeser designed their index to solve. In contrast, there were so many establishments in US manufacturing that the raw and corrected concentration indexes ended up being about the same in all but a handful of industries. Finally, governments in the US and EU have devoted substantial resources towards attracting Japanese investment. The wisdom of such outlays depends in part on the strength and pervasiveness of agglomeration effects.
Section 2 employs a location choice framework to derive empirical tests that help discriminate between the spillover and home market effect explanations of clustering. We show that the spillover model generates concentration in excess of what would be expected in the Ellison and Glaeser random choice model. However, home market effect models may generate excess concentration or excess dispersion relative to the random choice model. In the empirical section that follows, we use Ellison and Glaeser's index to measure concentration of Japanese FDI by industry and region (the United States and Europe). We show that about a third of the manufacturing industries in our sample exhibit excess concentration. Then we proceed to test for the source of this excess concentration. First, our conditional logit estimates reveal that after controlling for demand, firms are attracted to locations where there exists a high share of Japanese firms, a result consistent with agglomeration and inconsistent with the imperfect competition models. Next we relate the share of firms in a location to that location's share of demand. We find that a disproportionate response (coefficient greater than one) occasionally occurs for investment in the United States but not in Europe. Thus, we get only mixed support for the home market effect. We summarize the results in the final section. Head, Mayer, and Ries (2002) develop three models of imperfect competition in the context of the plant-location decision of N firms. The framework is a two-country model where singleproduct firms choose to locate a single plant in one country which will serve consumers in both markets. That paper shows that each model generates a similar set of equations. The difference in profits equation expresses the difference in the profitability of locating in two alternative production locations in terms of the distribution of demand and the existing distribution of firms. The share equation relates a country's equilibrium share of firms as a function its share of consumers. Here, we will summarize the results for these imperfect competition models and derive a corresponding set of equations for a second model-a spillover model-that we will show generates somewhat different predictions for the coefficients of these equations. In addition, we will compare the level of concentration predicted by the imperfect competition and spillover models to what would obtain under our formulation of the random choice model introduced by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) . We begin by describing the models and proceed to derive contrasting predictions that we can test with FDI data.
Theory
The three models of imperfect competition analyzed in Head, Mayer, and Ries (2002) are: The Krugman model as formulated in Helpman and Krugman (1985) ; the monopolistic competition model of Ottaviano, Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) ; and the Cournot, segmented markets model analyzed in Brander and Krugman (1983) . Each of the models incorporate alternative assumptions on the nature of demand, product market competition, and trade costs. In the Helpman-Krugman model, firms produce a single differentiated product and there is a constant elasticity of substitution between goods. Since the authors assumes a large number of firms, when choosing prices firms ignore the effect their pricing decision has on the overall price level. Trade costs take the iceberg form whereas they are per unit in the other two models. Firms also produce unique varieties in the Ottaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse model. Quadratic utility yields individual linear demand functions. As in the Helpman-Krugman model, firms choose prices to maximize their profits while neglecting the effect of individual price changes on the price index. The Brander-Krugman model depicts trade in homogeneous goods. Head, Mayer and Ries (2002) derives results for this model based on linear demand. All three models predict that the large country's share of output exceeds its share of firms, a result Helpman and Krugman (1985) call a home market effect. 1 Accordingly, we refer to the three models as home market effects (HME) models.
The spillover model we consider simply posits the profitability of investing in a country is a linear function of the number of firms already established there:
where n i is the number of firms locating in country i. The profit function is a reduced form expression. One interpretation is that the presence of firms in a country reduces the production costs of subsequent investors, thereby allowing them to produce greater output and gain higher profits.
The Difference in Profits Equation
Head, Mayer and Ries (2002) posit the difference in profits equation showing the difference in profits associated with investing in country 1 versus 2 in terms of 1's share of consumers (x) and its share of firms (s) as
Coefficient d is the demand effect which is positive: A country's attractiveness is increasing in its share of consumers. Coefficient c is the competition effect which is negative. When marginal costs are equal in the two countries, this equation is linear for the Ottaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse and Brander-Krugman models but nonlinear for the Helpman-Krugman model. The difference in profit equation for the spillover model is ∆π(s) = bN (2s − 1).
In contrast to the HME models, this equation is an increasing function of s and independent of x. Thus, these contrasting predictions can be a basis for discriminating between the models. Suppose that firms choose location sequentially and myopically, i.e. they take the existing value allocation of firms in their industry, s, as given and do not attempt to influence the subsequent locations of other firms. Suppose further that the firms perceive the difference in profits between two locations to be equal to the true (modeled) difference plus a random error term, denoted u. In that case the probability a firm will choose country 2 is given by
We assume u is given by the logistic distribution and estimate the probability of choosing country 2 as a function of s and x.
The HME models predict c < 0 and d > 0 whereas the spillover model predicts c > 0 and d = 0.
The Share Equation
We solve for the equilibrium distribution of firms, s, by setting the difference in profits equation equal to zero. This yields the share equation which is linear for all three HME models and can be expressed as
where h = d/(−c) > 1 and g = e/(−c) < 0 when marginal costs are equal in the two countries. The equation generates a greater than one-to-one relationship between a country's share of firms and its share of output. Since a country's share of firms cannot exceed one or be less than zero, the following piecewise function describes s:
In the case of the spillover model, setting the difference in profits equation equal to zero and solving for s yields the obvious result that profits are equal when there is an equal number of firms in each country. However, this distribution is not an equilibrium as firms could increase profits by moving to the other country. Thus, the two equilibria are all firms located in country 1 or all firms located in country 2.
The share equation provides a second means for discriminating empirically between the HME models and the spillover model. We can estimate
where is an error term. In the HME models, g < 0 and h > 1. In contrast, s is independent of x in the spillover model. Instead firms tend to completely concentrate in one country or the other. In the empirical implementation, there are nine locations. With nine locations, the spillover model predicts that the intercept will reflect the average location share, therefore implying g = 1/9.
Concentration Relative to the Dartboard
In the remainder of this section, we compare concentration predicted by the home market effect and spillover models to that of the dartboard model introduced by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) . They envision an investment as a dart and the host regions as areas on a dartboard. In our formulation, regions with larger demand are represented by larger areas and, therefore, are expected to receive larger shares of darts. 2 The dartboard model is a sensible "baseline" that can be compared to observed investment concentration.
Ellison and Glaeser consider a measure of concentration, G, calculated as the sum of squared differences between each host region's share of industry-level and aggregate economic activity. If x i is the share of area i in "all" activity (demand in our formulation) and S i is location i's share of activity in a particular industry, the G equals G = (S i − x i ) 2 , for possible location choices i = 1...M . With a large number of darts, the dartboard model predicts G = 0. In this case, investment in a region is distributed in proportion to the size of demand. Values above zero reflect geographic concentration.
This index can create a false impression of concentration when investment is "lumpy," i.e. when a small set of investors accounts for most of the amount invested. A simple example illustrates this case. Consider two investments into two equal-sized countries. The dartboard model predicts that half the time both investments will land in the same country and half the time in opposite countries. Thus, G = 0 half the time and is positive (G = .5) half the time. Lumpiness (only two investments) and random location imply the expected value of G will be .25. 3 It would be mistaken to interpret a positive value of G in such cases as concentration due to agglomeration economies, the home market effect, or other economic mechanisms. Thus, we will consider an industry to have excess concentrated when G exceeds its expected level under the dartboard. Likewise, excess dispersion occurs when G is less than the dartboard model prediction.
We begin by evaluating the HME models. In the two-country case considered in Head, Mayer, and Ries (2002) , the G index can be re-expressed as
where in our formulation S is country 1's share of output and x is its share of consumers. We have already established the distribution of firms, s, as a function of the distribution of demand, x. In the Helpman-Krugman model, each firm produces the same output thus S = s for all x.
In the Brander-Krugman and Ottaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse models, output per firm varies with x.
The appendix shows that in the absence of costs differences, these models predict that output per firm is greater for firms in the large market. This means that S > s when x > 1/2 and S < s when x < 1/2. Thus, the large country produces a disproportionate share of output relative to its share of consumers. Figure 1 displays the plots of S and s against x for the case of equal marginal costs of production. The 45-degree line in Figure 1 indicates the values for which the location of the industry mimics the international location of demand. The bold line represents equilibrium s for the three HME models. It also represents S in the case of the Krugman model. The dashed line characterizes equilibrium S for the Ottaviano-Tabuchi-Thisse and the Brander-Krugman models. The share of firms grows linearly with the share of consumers with a slope greater than one. The share of production exhibits a "S" shape around this line, with production being even more clustered than firms. Intuitively, when x > 1/2 there are more firms in country 2 and each of these firms produces more than the firms in country 1 because the transport gives firms in country 2 greater access to the larger pool of consumers than firms located in country 1. Figure 1 also provides an indication of the behaviour of G in equilibrium. Recall that G equals 2(S − x) 2 in the two-country case and thus is an increasing function of the difference between S and x. It equals zero at x = 0, x = 1/2, and x = 1 and reaches two peaks between these points.
We are interested in contrasting the values of G in our model for different ranges of the distribution of demand with those expected in the dartboard model developed in Ellison and Glaeser (1997) . The important insight of Ellison and Glaeser is that G in the dartboard model will be greater than zero when a small number of establishments accounts for a large share of total employment in a region. As discussed earlier, the example of two darts thrown at a target with two equal-sized areas will only generate an area's share of investment matching its share of the overall target area one-half the time. Thus, expected G in this case will exceed zero. Ellison and Glaeser determine the expected concentration exhibited by a dartboard model to be
where H ≡ z 2 k is the Herfindahl for the plant-level concentration of activity in the industry (z k is plant k's share of total output in the industry) and
i is a measure of the dispersion of economic activity across locations. To gain intuition on the terms D and H, consider the case of M identical countries and N identical firms. This implies H = 1/N and
, only approaches zero as N becomes large. In the case of the empirical work that follows, this condition will not normally be met so we expect G > 0 even if location choice is random as depicted by the dartboard model. Figure 2 characterizes the relationship between G and DH. We generate the figure using the Brander-Krugman model and the appendix establishes that the qualitative results are the same in the other two models. 4 DH has a parabolic shape with a peak at x = 1/2 in the three HME models. G has two peaks on either side of x = 1/2. The figure shows that G can be either higher or lower than E[G] = DH. G < DH when countries are equal sized (x = .5) or nearly equal sized. This result is due to competition effects that encourage firms to differentiate geographically. When market size considerations are absent, firms will never locate in the same country and we would observe complete dispersion of investment. In the dartboard model, however, random chance causes firms to cluster with some positive probability.
As x deviates from .5, however, market size considerations induce firms to cluster and the large country's share of output will exceed its share of demand. This leads to equilibrium concentration in excess of what is expected under the dartboard model (G > DH). The decline in G in the outer portions of the graph is related to the corner solutions that occur in our model where all firms locate in the large country (s = 1 or s = 0). This decline in G in the outer portions of the graph creates additional regions where G < DH. In the range of x where s = 1 or s = 0, all firms in the industry are located in the same country. Nevertheless, G changes with the x since it is a function of that variable. G equals zero when the complete concentration of industry mimics the complete concentration of demand.
With regard to the spillover model, the analysis is much simpler. The equilibria consist of all firms located in country 1 (s = 1) or country 2 (s = 0). In the two-country case, the G index equals 2(S − x) 2 . Consequently, half the time G = 2(1 − x) 2 and half the time G = 2x 2 . Thus, on average G = x 2 + (1 − x) 2 . Recall that expected concentration, E[G], equals DH where H is the plant-level Herfindahl index and
The positive first term is at its minimum value for x ≡ 1/2. Setting x = 1/2 yields
This expression is strictly positive as long as the number of firms exceeds one implying H < 1. Thus, the spillover model predicts concentration in excess of the baseline dartboard prediction. Table 1 summarizes the competing predictions of the models in regard to the Ellison and Glaeser concentration measure, conditional logit estimation of the probability of choosing a location, and OLS estimates of the share equation. 
Share regression
Empirics
We start by looking at the G indexes to see if some industries exhibit significantly negative G − DH. We then estimate a conditional logit on the location choices of Japanese firms in the United States and in Europe to identify home market effects, competition effects, and spillovers. Finally, we estimate the relationship between a country's share of demand and its share of FDI industry by industry as a test for home market effects. All of the empirical tests are conducted at the industry level. In the body of this section we provide tables summarizing the results for the set of industries. The appendix lists results for individual industries. We use two samples of Japanese FDI in the two major host areas of overseas investment: the United States and the European Union. The observations come from a survey of the JETRO (Japan External TRade Organization) for investments in the EU and from a survey by the JEI (Japan Economic Institute) for FDI in the US. We restrict the period covered to be 1970-1992 for the U.S. case and 1970-1995 for the European one, periods covering the vast majority of investments. To be able to compare across samples, we first classify the investments in the same industry classification (namely 3-digit US SIC). We also use the nine US regions as the choice set of Japanese investors in the USA instead of the U.S. states, because the number of regions precisely corresponds to the number of European countries we are considering. We also drop acquisitions for Japanese FDI in the United States (JETRO does not give any indication on the greenfield / acquisition nature of FDI in Europe but states that an important share of FDI is greenfield 5 ). Our sample for Japanese FDI in the United States covers 888 investments, while we have 572 investments in nine European countries (France, Germany, United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Belgium, The Netherlands, Portugal). Table 2 gives the summary statistics of G and its expectation under the dartboard model E[G] for our two samples: Japanese investments in the nine United States regions and in the nine European countries. The formulas for G and its dartboard expectation shown in the theory section are:
where H ≡ z 2 k is the Herfindahl index of industry plant sizes, i.e. z k is plant or affiliate k's share of total employment in the industry. D ≡ 1 − x 2 i measures the dispersion of economic activity across locations. We consider two ways of defining x i , the aggregate economic activity in an area. Our primary measure will be location i's share of Japanese total affiliate employment in the considered zone (The USA or the EU). This follow's Ellison and Glaeser's (1997) use of total manufacturing employment. Since the theoretical model interprets x i as representing country i's share of demand, we also calculate x i using GDPs of European countries and the population of American regions. We use the figures corresponding to the end of the sample, that is 1995 GDP for European nations and 1992 population of American regions.
For investment into the U.S. and Europe, the first line reports results for our demand measure of x i (GDP or population). The second line reports the results for x defined as the total employment of manufacturing affiliates. This latter interpretation of x was emphasized by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) . To permit comparison with their results, we report the results for the comprehensive sample of plants in the U.S. used by Ellison and Glaeser. Their study used states, rather than our 9 regions, as the geographic unit.
To obtain an idea of how large the deviation of the concentration index G from the dartboard DH is, we use the variance of G defined by Ellison and Glaeser (1997) as:
We consider FDI in an industry to be geographically clustered when the absolute value of G − DH is larger than two standard deviations of G.
5 About 65% of all Japanese FDI in Europe is greenfield. The corresponding figure for the most represented industry in terms of the number of investments (electronics devices and components) is around 80%.
For each host region, the mean values of the Herfindhal index as well as the index of raw concentration G is given as well as the percent of industries exhibiting concentration lower or greater than the dartboard expectation. It should first be emphasized that the two samples exhibit striking similarities in terms of average levels of both industry and geographical concentration. As could have been expected, the Herfindhal indexes and raw geographic concentration indexes of Japanese affiliates are much higher than the corresponding figures for the sample of American firms. This latter result is a consequence of the much larger number of plants used by Ellison and Glaeser. Note: The signs -and + respectively design that G − DH is negative or positive with an absolute value inferior to two standard deviations. Conversely, --and ++ repectively design that G − DH is negative or positive with an absolute value superior to two standard deviations.
Our first noteworthy result is that no industry in either host area is characterized by a G less than DH by more than two standard deviations. As emphasized in the beginning of this section, industries with an observed clustering measure substantially under the dartboard would have been discriminating in favor of the HME model. However the table reveals that FDI in no industries in either the U.S. or Europe exhibit significant excess dispersion. Instead, roughly 70% of the industries are not substantially more or less concentrated than the dartboard and the remaining 30% exhibit excess concentration.
The next two empirical exercises generate industry-specific estimates of coefficients for the model specifying the probability of a country/region receiving investment (conditional logit) and relating the share of FDI to the share of demand in a country/region. An important point to keep in mind is that each industry regression for the share equation contains nine observations (the number of regions/countries). Thus, we have limited information to assess the statistic significance of reported relationships. Table 3 summarizes the results of conditional logit estimations by industry of the location choices of Japanese firms in Europe and in the United States. For each area, the table reports the number of industries for which the estimation of the conditional logit was possible, the average value of G, and the distribution of estimated coefficients on variable s, the share of firms in the region. There are two rows for each area. The first row gives results for the unrestricted sample, the second row gives results only for the industries for which G − DH was greater in absolute value to two standard deviations of G. An important feature of the industry by industry logit estimation of location choice is that only one industry exhibits a significantly negative coefficient on s (the Yarn and Thread Industry in the EU (SIC 228). Also about 40% of the industries exhibit a positive and significant (at the 10% level) influence of rivals' location on a firm's location choice independently of the location zone. This figure is dramatically increased when one considers the subsample of industries that are substantially concentrated according to the G − DH index. Around 70% of industries which are much more concentrated than the dartboard also exhibit a significant positive coefficient on s in the conditional logit estimation. Together, those features leave little support for the HME models of location choice presented in the theory section which predicts a negative coefficient on s and indicates that the spillovers explanation to clustering may be relevant in a great number of industries. Of course, the negative influence of product market interactions may exist but it could be outweighed by positive influences. One positive factor is positive spillovers between firms. Moreover, s may be reflecting positive attributes of regions/countries attracting investments that are not accounted for in our model.
Our last empirical exercise tests for the home market effect by estimating equation (4) for each of our industries. The HME models yields a more than proportional relation between the equilibrium share of firms and the share of demand in the location. The HME models also predicts a negative intercept as a result of the home market effect. We thus calculate the share of Japanese investments in each American region (European nation) at the end of the sample period and regress it against the share of demand, that is the share of population (share of GDP) for the same year. The estimation method is a tobit regression intended to account for the fact that many industry/location combinations did not get any Japanese investment. Table 4 gives summary results of these market size effect estimations. It states in particular how the coefficient on the demand ratio significantly differs from one, an indication of the home market effect.
For each area, the first row reports results for the whole sample of industries and the second row reports the intercept when the coefficient on demand is significantly greater than one. Although the number of industries exhibiting a coefficient significantly greater than unity on demand is not very large (9 for Japanese FDI in the USA, 2 for Japanese FDI in the EU), those sectors show a consistent home market effect as they are generally ones for which the intercept is significantly negative. 6 It is noteworthy that the proportion of industries exhibiting Note: Three positive or negative signs denote significance at the 5% level, two signs denote significance at the 10% level and a unique sign denotes the sign of the insignificant t-stat. The significance is calculated with respect to 1 for the demand variable and with respect to 0 for the intercept. Regressions run using tobit.
a coefficient on the share of demand superior to unity is greater in the case of investment in the US relative to investment in the EU (the mean value of the coefficient is 6.04 for FDI in the US and 1.27 for EU as a hosting zone). This is consistent with HME model predictions in which the coefficient h in equation (4) is strictly decreasing in the trade cost τ . That is, making the reasonable assumption that trade costs are generally significantly higher inside the EU than inside the US, our model predicts that the steepness of the s curve in figure 1 should be closer to the 45-degree line in the EU case, resulting in a lower estimate of the coefficient on x for this sample. This section has assessed whether the pattern of Japanese FDI in the United States and Europe is consistent with the predictions of the HME models or pure spillovers model. We have employed three discriminating tests: The difference between concentration measure G against the dartboard prediction DH, conditional logit regressions relating the probability of investment to a location's existing share of investment and its share of demand, and the share regression relating a location's share of industry investment to its share of demand. Now we identify the industries that seem to be most consistent with one model or the other. Recall that Table 1 displays the parameter predictions of the models in terms of the three empirical methods. We consider that an industry "passes" the discriminating test of a particular model if the estimated coefficient or statistic is consistent with the prediction shown in Table 1 .
In general, we consider a parameter estimate to consistent with a model if it passes a significance test. In the case of the Ellison-Glaeser measure of economic concentration, the criterion is whether G is two standard deviations away from DH. With regard to conditional logit regressions, directly estimated parameters are considered consistent with a model when the t-test is significant at the 10% level with two exceptions. The prediction of the HME models that d > −c is not subject to a significance test. In the case of the share regressions, parameter estimates are evaluated based on a 10% significance level. Table 5 places industries listed by 3-digit SIC numbers into cells indicating the industry estimates are in accordance with model predictions. The appendix provides the industry name for each industry number. The figures in boldface identify industries which correspond to not significantly different from zero. 372, 205, 209, 253, 282, 323, 344, 345, 346, 369, 371 289, 331, 347, 363, 375, 382, 386, 394 EU 356, 285, 358, 366, 371, 394 352 Note: Industries in normal font pass two out of three tests in Table 1 ; industries in bold face pass all three tests.
the whole set of predictions of the model they are classified in. For instance, industry 371 is characterized by a concentration index greater than the dartboard by more than two standard deviations. It also has a positive and significant coefficient c and a coefficient d not significantly different from zero in the conditional logit. For this industry, we also find that coefficients g and h are respectively not significantly different from 1/9 and 0. Thus this industry passes all three tests of the spillover model. However, some industries only pass some of the discriminating tests and we show industries in normal font that pass tests of two (out of the three) methods. For instance, there are nine industries characterized by home market effects in the share equation but c is not significantly negative in the conditional logit. These industries trivially pass the Ellison-Glaeser test since the HME models does not restrict how G deviates from DH. We put these industries in normal font in the HME column as they pass only two of the tests. Correspondingly, normal font industries in the pure spillovers column are those that pass two tests of this model. As can be seen in the table, only a minority of industries that we examine appear to be consistent with a particular model. Of those that are, most are consistent with the spillover model. Two points should be kept in mind when assessing these results. First, we have limited information to conduct statistical tests: There are a relatively small number of investments in each industry and nine locations. Second, it is posible that the two competing models may have some relevance for a particular industry, thereby making it impossible to satisfy all requirements of any single "pure" model (there may be both home market effects and spillovers present).
While the number of industries characterized by spillovers is not very large, the specific industries turn out to represent a very important share of Japanese overall investment, particularly in the US. The 3-digit SIC industry 371 corresponds to motor vehicles assembly and parts and represents 27% of all Japanese employment in the US sample. Together, the spillovers industries represent about 41% of total Japanese affiliates employment in the US. The equivalent figure is around 17% for Japanese FDI in the EU with motor vehicles representing 15% alone. However, we add a caution about the interpretation of these results as suggesting spillovers characterizes a large share of Japanese investment. If spillovers exist in an industry, it should be evident in both host areas. However, only motor vehicles (371) obtains results that are consistent with spillovers for both US and EU regressions.
Conclusion
Industry agglomeration may occur for a number of reasons. Firms in the same industry may be attracted to locations with favourable factor conditions. They may locate near similar firms to access positive spillovers. The home market effect is a third reason to observe concentration of industry.
The starting point to investigating the sources of industry concentration is identification of agglomeration itself. This can be accomplished by comparing observed concentration against a sensible benchmark. The benchmark we employ is a random choice model of investment where investment mirrors the distribution of demand subject to random variation. This baseline model is a particular formulation of the one used in Ellison and Glaeser (1997) . We find significant excess concentration for over one quarter of our industries. No industries exhibit significant excess dispersion.
Our HME models all predict a linear and more than proportional relationship between the share of firms and the share of local demand in an industry, which can result in excess concentration. The models give rise to two empirical tests. First, the probability of a location receiving investment is a positive function of its share of demand and a negative function of the share of firms already there. Second, the line relating an location's share of investment and its share of demand should have a negative intercept and a slope exceeding one. We contrast these predictions with those expected under pure spillover model.
We employ regression analysis at the industry level to test the models. The probability and share relations are estimated with conditional logit and tobit estimation, respectively. The parameter estimates from these regressions are the basis to evaluate the consistency of the data with each model. The power of these tests are limited by the small number of observations in the regressions. We find that many industries are consistent with the spillover model although the same industries do not emerge in the separate analysis of the two host areas. There is also partial support for the HME models. Overall, we find that no single model among the ones we consider explains the pattern of Japanese FDI across industries. Thus, FDI concentration appears to arise from a number of sources.
References
A Geographic Concentration by Industry Table 6 gives summary results by SIC 3-digit industry of the three empirical methods used in this paper. For each of the two host regions, the United States and European Union, are given the G i index, the coefficient c on the share of previous investments (s) in the conditional logit and the coefficient on x (h i ) in the share equation. Those three coefficients are indexed by i = eu, us denoting the hosting zone. The G figures are given a sign superscript indicating whether G is less or greater than the dartboard expectation DH. A star additionaly indicates the industries for which the deviation from the dartboard is superior to 2 standard deviations.
For coefficients c i and h i , * and † indicate respectively significance at the 5 and 10% levels. Statistical significance is calculated with respect to 0 for c i and with respect to 1 for h i . 
B Data Sources and Construction
The data used in this paper came from four sources:
Japan Economic Institute Greenfield manufacturing investments in the United States from 1970 to 1990 (operation dates, so some investments dated as late as 1992).
Japan External Trade Organization Manufacturing investments in Europe.
Population Estimates Program Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census provides annual estimates of population for each state.
Eurostat Regio provide GDP for each European nation.
C Firm size differences and G
This appendix first establishes that in the Brander-Krugman model, firms located in the large country produce greater output than firms located in the small country. Since the large country hosts a disproportionate share of firms, this result implies that the large country will produce a disporportionate share of output. We will then detail the analytics of the Brander-Krugman relationship between G − DH and x which is plotted in the text. Although the results are simpler in the Brander-Krugman case, all qualitative results are similar under the OttavianoTabuchi-Thisse and Helpman-Krugman models for which we only display the same equilibrium G − DH against x plots. Since firms in a given country are identical in our model, in equilibrium S = sN z 2 , where z 2 is the individual market share of a firm located in country 2. Market shares for a representative firm operating in country k are
where q ki is the output of a firm located in country k sold to consumers in country i and Q i is total output sold to consumers in country i. Inserting equilibrium quantities available in the appendix in Head, Mayer and Ries (2002) 
q 11 = xM (1 − ω + (1 − s)N τ ) (N + 1)
where M is the total number of consumers and ω measures marginal costs. Inserting these quantities into Q 1 = (1 − s)N q 11 + sN q 21 and Q 2 = (1 − s)N q 12 + sN q 22 , we obtain total quantity consumed and produced on the whole market:
Inserting equilibrium quantities to the formula for z k , we obtain the difference in market shares:
.
If z 2 = z 1 then both equal 1/N , so S = s. If firms in country 2 are larger than firms in country 1, i.e. z 2 − z 1 > 0, S will exceed s. This will occur when x < 1/2. Equilibrium z 1 and z 2 are used to calculate H = (1 − s)N z 2 1 + sN z 2 2 . Recalling that D = 1 − x 2 − (1 − x) 2 , we get
The equilibrium value of G = (S − x) 2 + (x − S) 2 requires to solve for the equilibrium share of output S which in turn requires to solve for s as a solution to π 2 − π 1 = 0:
Which finally gives us all the elements to trace G and DH as functions of x in Figure 2 . 
